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Abstract
Data-agnostic quasi-imperceptible perturbations on in-
puts are known to degrade recognition accuracy of deep
convolutional networks severely. This phenomenon is consid-
ered to be a potential security issue. Moreover, some results
on statistical generalization guarantees indicate that the
phenomenon can be a key to improve the networks’ general-
ization. However, the characteristics of the shared directions
of such harmful perturbations remain unknown. Our primal
finding is that convolutional networks are sensitive to the di-
rections of Fourier basis functions. We derived the property
by specializing a hypothesis of the cause of the sensitivity,
known as the linearity of neural networks, to convolutional
networks and empirically validated it. As a by-product of the
analysis, we propose an algorithm to create shift-invariant
universal adversarial perturbations available in black-box
settings.
1. Introduction
Malicious perturbations on inputs can easily change pre-
dictions of deep learning models [38]. These perturba-
tions are called adversarial perturbations or adversarial ex-
amples. They have been intensively studied concerning
deep convolutional networks for object recognition tasks
[4, 7, 21, 26, 38, 41]. They are attracting attention be-
cause they are potential security issues. One of the intrigu-
ing aspects of adversarial perturbations is their universality.
Szegedy et al. [38] observed transferability of the perturba-
tions between classifiers. Papernot et al. [30, 31] exploited
the transferability to attack black-box models. Some adver-
sarial perturbations transfer not only between classifiers but
also between inputs. Goodfellow et al. [7] first discovered
the universality, and Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [24] studied
this phenomenon in more detail. They found that a single
perturbation can change models’ predictions for a significant
portion of data points. Such input-agnostic perturbations
are called universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs). The
Figure 1. Examples of images perturbed by single Fourier attack.
Added perturbation is the same as in Figure 3. The size of perturba-
tions is 10/255 in `∞-distance for the first row and 20/255 for the
second. In Sec. 5.7, we show that the single 10/255 and 20/255
perturbations could change predictions for around 40% and 70%
of inputs for various architectures, respectively.
perturbations also generalize between different networks to
some extent.
We are primarily concerned with UAPs because of their
relation to statistical generalization guarantees of deep learn-
ing models. For example, studies using PAC-Bayes [29],
compression [1], and minimum description length [11] are
all concerned with how perturbation propagates networks.1
In these analyses, how each perturbation changes accuracy
on training data and true data distribution matters. In other
words, we have an interest in perturbations transferable be-
tween inputs. These are nothing else but UAPs. We try to
shed lights on the tendency of UAPs and how they propagate
1 In these studies, we consider perturbations on weights, not inputs.
However, perturbations on weights become noises on inputs of the network’s
subnetworks and investigating UAPs is still useful.
Figure 2. Illustration of our UAPs creation algorithm. We only tune frequency of noise. We do not need access to model parameters, output
logits, or training data.
in convolutional neural networks.
Several prior studies tried to understand the properties
of the universality and transferability of adversarial pertur-
bations. Goodfellow et al. [7] explained the existence of
adversarial examples, their transferability, and their univer-
sality using linearity of deep neural networks. Trame`r et
al. [40] investigated the transferable subspace of adversarial
perturbations and suggested that it will consist of a high-
dimensional continuous subspace. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
[25] showed that the existence of universal adversarial pertur-
bations is inevitable given strong geometrical assumptions
on the decision boundaries of models.
Given the transferability and the universality of adversar-
ial perturbations, it is natural to expect the existence of a set
of directions to which most networks are input-agnostically
sensitive. If we can characterize such directions, it enables
us to improve robustness against such perturbations in princi-
pled manners. Additionally, we may design better posteriors,
weights, or compression algorithms to achieve empirically
better generalization bounds. However, prior work can only
generate such perturbations by sequential optimization and
lacks their useful characterization. We provide a missing
characterization of directions by analyzing Fourier basis
functions.
The motivation of our analysis comes from two parts.
The first is the linear hypothesis of vulnerability, and the
second is a property of linear convolutional layers that the
singular vectors of which are Fourier basis functions. The
property indicates that sensitive directions of convolutional
networks are a combination of a few Fourier basis functions.
Through extensive experiments on various architectures and
datasets, we found networks are sensitive to the directions of
Fourier basis functions of some specific frequencies. In other
words, we could characterize at least a subset of universal
and transferable adversarial perturbations through Fourier
basis functions. We also observed that some adversarial per-
turbations exploit the sensitivity to Fourier basis functions.
These findings not only provide a new characterization of
adversarial perturbations with benefits described in the pre-
ceding paragraph but also suggest a possibility that some
known properties of the universality of adversarial perturba-
tions might be due to the structure of convolutional networks.
As a by-product of our analysis, we also developed a
method to create shift-invariant universal adversarial pertur-
bations, which is available in black-box settings. Figure 1
shows examples of perturbed images created by our algo-
rithm, which is explained in Sec. 4. Our perturbations have
simple and shift-invariant patterns, yet achieved high fool
ratio on various pairs of architectures and datasets.
Our contributions are summarized below.
1. We characterized spaces UAPs lie using Fourier basis
functions.
2. We evaluated our hypothesis in extensive experiments.
3. We proposed a black-box algorithm to create shift-
invariant universal adversarial perturbations.
2. Related work
2.1. Adversarial perturbations
One of the most famous algorithms for creating adversar-
ial perturbations is the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [7].
Let J(θ, x, t) be a loss with parameter θ, an input x, and a
target label t. Then, FGSM uses  · Sign (∇xJ(θ, x, t)) as
the perturbation, where  is a scaling parameter. Another
popular approach is performing gradient ascent on some
loss J(θ, x, t). Depending on the choice of the loss and
the optimization methods, there are numerous variants for
attacks [4, 26]. Adversarial training [7] is a current effective
countermeasure against adversarial perturbations. Kurakin et
al. [21] conducted a large-scale study on adversarial training,
and Trame`r et al. [39] extensively studied the transferability
for defended and undefended models. Evaluations of de-
fense methods are notoriously difficult [2, 42]. Thus, some
studies have provided theoretically grounded defense meth-
ods [18, 43].
2.2. Universal adversarial perturbations
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [24] showed that some input-
independent perturbations can significantly degrade classi-
fiers’ prediction accuracy. Such perturbations are called uni-
versal adversarial perturbations (UAPs). Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [24] created UAPs by sequentially optimizing pertur-
bations until we achieve the desired fool ratio. During the
creation, they did not need access to test data. They showed
that UAPs could change over 80% of the predictions of var-
ious networks trained on ILSVRC2012 [32]. UAPs also
generalize between network architectures to some extent.
Recently, Mopuri et al. [27] and Khrulkov et al. [17] pro-
posed activation-maximization approaches for the creation
of UAPs. UAPs degrade the average performance of systems
and have different nature from other kinds of adversarial
examples.
2.3. Analysis of transferability and universality
Goodfellow et al. [7] explained the existence of adver-
sarial examples, their transferability, and their universality
by linear hypothesis. In their explanation, the directions of
perturbations are the most important in adversarial examples.
The hypothesis is based on the following three factors: (1)
modern networks behave like linear classifiers, (2) adver-
sarial perturbations are aligned with the weight vectors of
models, (3) different models learn similar functions. Thus,
adversarial perturbations generalize between clean examples,
and also different models. Trame`r et al. [40] analyzed the
dimensionality of the subspace that adversarial examples lie
in. Using first-order approximation, they found that adversar-
ial examples lie in a high-dimensional subspace, suggesting
overwrap of the subspace between classifiers. However, the
structure of the subspace is unknown except for its estimated
dimensionality. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [25] analyzed the
existence of UAPs using strong geometrical assumptions.
They also proposed an algorithm to find UAPs using Hessian
on input, while it is prohibitively slow with large inputs.
We explain the existence of UAPs on the basis of the
linear hypothesis of Goodfellow et al. [7]. We push forward
the analysis concerning convolutional networks.
2.4. Fourier basis
Jo and Bengio [15] examined whether CNNs learn high-
level features by using Fourier features. Some prior work
used eps compression or other transformations as defenses
against adversarial examples [16, 9, 35]. They remove high-
frequency features from images and relates to this paper.
However, connections to universality have not been explored.
Also, the effects of each frequency have not been studied.
In a later section (5), our experiments show that adversarial
perturbations do not necessarily lie in high-frequency spots.
3. Preliminary
In this section, we describe the relationship between con-
volutional layers and Fourier basis. Notations are summa-
rized in the supplementary material.
3.1. Fourier basis and discrete Fourier transforma-
tion
Let us define ωi,jN = ω
i
Nω
j
N ∈ CN×N , where ωN =
exp(2pi
√−1/N) is the N -th root of an imaginary number.
We define FN be a matrix such that colums are n fourier
basis functions with different frequencies. In other words,
FN is a matrix such that
(FN )u,v =
1√
N
ωu,vN . (1)
We notate the i-th row of FN as (FN )i. Let us define a
transformation S : CN×N → CN×N as follows.
S(x)u,v =
N−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
xm,n exp(−2pi
√−1(um+ vn)/N)
(2)
This transformation S is called discrete Fourier transforma-
tion (DFT). Both the transformation and its inverse can be
calculated in the running time of O(N logN) by using fast
Fourier transformation [5].
3.2. Decomposition of convolution operator
We define QN := 1N FN ⊗ FN , where ⊗ is a Kronecker
product. The eigenvectors of a doubly block circulant matrix
are known to be QN [13]. Since QN is unitary, a dou-
bly block circulant matrix can be decomposed as QNDQHN ,
where QHN is an adjoint matrix of QN , and D is a complex
diagonal matrix. In a case where channel size is one, since
convolution is a doubly circulant matrix when the padding is
“wraps around”[6, 33], the above analysis is directly appli-
cable. We can extend the result to multi-channel cases, i.e.,
m ≥ 1.
Proposition 1. Let M be a matrix which represents a con-
volutional layer with input channel size min, output channel
size mout, and input size min × N × N . Then, M can be
decomposed as
M = (Imout ⊗QN )L (Imin ⊗QN )H , (3)
where L is a block matrix whose blocks are N2 ×N2 diago-
nal matrices.
4. Fourier analysis
In this section, we show that the most sensitive direction
of linear convolutional networks is a combination of a few
Fourier basis functions. The analysis pushes forward the
linear hypothesis of the cause of adversarial examples in
Goodfellow et al. [7]. The linear approximation may not
hold well for deep non-linear networks. However, we can
still expect that adding some Fourier basis functions to inputs
can largely disturb hidden representations of networks. We
assume that the padding of convolutional layers are “wraps
around.” Notations are summarized in the supplementary
material. Proofs of propositions are deferred to the supple-
mentary material.
4.1. Sensitivity of stacked convolutional layers
We first consider stacked stride-1 convolutional layers
without activation functions. In the case, we can show that
the singular vectors of the whole layers can be represented
by a linear combination of single Fourier basis functions
between input channels.
Proposition 2. Let M (i) be a convolitional layer with in-
put channel size m(l), output channel size m(l+1), input
size m(l) × N × N , and stride 1. Let M be a stacked
convolutional layers with linear activation, i.e., M(X) =(
M (1) ◦M (2) ◦ · · · ◦M (d)) (X). Then, we can choose the
right singular vectors of M so that all of them can be repre-
sented by a⊗(FN )i⊗(FN )j for some i, j ∈ {0, . . . , N−1}
and a ∈ Cm(1) .
In other words, the most sensitive directions of linear
convolutional neural networks without reduction layers is
a single Fourier basis function. We can further extend the
result to cases when there are normalization layers or skip
connections.
Proposition 3. Let M (i) be a convolitional layer with input
channel size m(l), output channel size m(l+1), input size
m(l)×N×N , and stride 1. LetM be a stacked convolutional
layers with linear activation plus a skip connection, i.e.,
M(X) =
(
M (1) ◦M (2) ◦ · · · ◦M (d)) (X) +X . Then, we
can choose the right singular vectors of M so that all of
them can be represented by a ⊗ (FN )i ⊗ (FN )j for some
i, j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} and a ∈ Cm(1) .
Proposition 4. A convolutional layer followed by a nor-
malization layer such as batch-normalization or weight-
normalization can be rerepresented as another convolutional
layer without normalization at test time. Thus, Props. 2 and
3 also hold when normalization layers exist.
These propositions show that manipulating a single
Fourier basis function on inputs can be most effective to
disturb internal representations of convolutional neural net-
works.
4.2. Reduction layers
In this section, we show that the singular values of the
convolutional layers can be written by a combination of a few
Fourier basis functions even when there are reduction layers,
such as convolutional layers with stride > 1 or average
pooling layers.
Proposition 5. Let M be a convolutional layer with stride
s > 1 where N = 0 (mod s). Then, we can choose the right
singular vectors of the layer so that all of them can be rep-
resented by a linear combination of Fourier basis functions
{(FN )i′ ⊗ (FN )j′ |i′ = i (mod N/s), j′ = j (mod N/s)}
for some i and j.
Since the average pooling layer is a special case of con-
volutional layers, we can apply the above theorem to the
layer.
4.3. Single Fourier attack
We propose an algorithm to find universal adversarial per-
turbations using Fourier basis functions. The attack exploits
the sensitivity of convolutional networks to the Fourier basis
directions analyzed in the previous section. While the linear
approximation in the analysis might not hold well in deep
networks, we can still expect that the directions will disturb
hidden representations.
A sketch of the algorithm is as follows. We select one
Fourier basis function and use it as a UAP. The method to
select the frequency is described later in this section. The
sketch of the algorithm is incompatible with the restriction
that the inputs must be real. To satisfy the condition, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 6. S(x)i,j = S(x)∗N−i,N−j iff the input x is
real-valued, where S(x)∗ is a conjugate of S(x).
Thus, we make S(x)i,j = S(x)∗N−i,N−j satisfied to meet
the real-value constraint. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode
of the algorithm, which is named single Fourier attack (SFA).
Figure 3 shows a visualization of Fourier basis in 8×8 space
and an example of perturbations created by SFA. Figure 1
shows examples of perturbed images. It seems that this
attack does not change human’s predictions, and models
should be robust against the attack.
To perform the attack, we need to find effective frequen-
cies of the target classifiers. To test the sensitivity, first, we
query a pair of an original image and its perturbed version.
Next, we check whether the classifier’s output differs or not.
We repeat the procedure and solve a black-box optimization
problem formulated as follows.
Problem 1. Given a data distribution D ⊂ RN×N×3, tar-
get function f : RN×N×3× ({1, . . . , N} × {1, . . . , N})→
{0, 1}, find a frequency w ∈ {1, . . . , N} × {1, . . . , N}
which maximizes ∫
D
f(x,w)dx. (4)
Algorithm 1: Single Fourier attack
hyperparam :i, j: frequency, : size of perturbation
input :x : image
foreach c in channel:
xc ← xc + ((1 + i)(FN )i ⊗ (FN )j
+(1− i)(FN )N−i ⊗ (FN )N−j);
xc ←Clip(xc, 0, 1);
Figure 3. Left: Visualization of Fourier basis in 8 × 8 space.
Row i and column j shows (F8)i ⊗ (F8)j . Right: An example
of perturbations created by Single Fourier attack in Alg. 1. This
perturbation was used in later evaluation (Sec. 5.7).
One naive approach to approximately solve the problem
is testing all frequencies with a batch of images and find a
frequency with the highest fool ratio. The batchsize controls
the variance of the evaluation of each frequency. Even if
we do the brute-force search, we can create UAPs within a
reasonable amount of time thanks to the simplicity of our
formulation. As more query efficient methods, we can also
use Bayesian optimization techniques [36, 3]. We show that
the search of the frequency has a favorable property for such
methods in Sec. 5.4. This suggests our algorithm is useful
even when only small numbers of queries are allowed to
create UAPs.
Our formulation and algorithm have the following two
key benefits. First, we formulated the creation of UAPs
as an optimization problem of two discrete variables. On
the other hand, the original problem has the same number
of parameters with the input size, which can be tens of
thousands. This reduction of parameters to optimize is a
significant simplification. Second, our algorithm requires
neither model parameters nor output logits. Prior UAPs
creation algorithms require access to models or substituted
models created by attackers. These requirements have made
the attacks less practical. In our algorithm, we only require
the information on the predicted label by the target. Thus,
the algorithm is available in broader settings.
5. Experiments
We presented a characterization of the universal adversar-
ial directions through Fourier basis functions in Sec. 4. To
show that the characterization well describes the nature of
the universal adversarial directions, we conducted a series of
experiments. Primarily, we answer the following questions.
1. Whether Fourier basis characterization is better than
others such as characterization using the standard basis
(Sec. 5.2).
2. Whether the sensitivity to the Fourier basis directions
is unique to convolutional networks (Sec. 5.3).
3. Whether UAPs are related to Fourier basis directions
(Sec. 5.5).
4. Whether current white-box attacks are also related to
Fourier basis directions (Sec 5.6).
5. Whether manipulation on a single Fourier basis can
image-agnostically change predictions of various con-
volutional neural networks and datasets (Sec. 5.7).
5.1. Evaluation setups
This section describes the evaluation setups. A
more detailed explanation can be found in the sup-
plementary material. We used MNIST [23], fashion-
MNIST [44], SVHN [28], CIFAR10, CIFAR100 [19], and
ILSVRC2015 [32] as datasets. We used a multi-layer per-
ceptron (MLP) consisting of 1000–1000 hidden layer with
ReLU activation, LeNet [22], WideResNet [45], DenseNet-
BC [12], and VGG [34] with batch-normalization for
evaluations on datasets except for ILSVRC2015. For
ILSVRC2015, we used ResNet50 [10], DenseNet, VGG16,
and GoogLeNet [37]. For VGG16 and GoogLeNet, we
added a batch-normalization layer after each convolution
for faster training. We used the fool ratio as a metric, which
is the percentage of data that models changed their predic-
tions, following Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [24].
5.2. Fourier domain vs pixel domain
We analyzed the sensitivity of deep convolutional neu-
ral networks to the directions of Fourier basis functions in
Sec. 4. To empirically support the analysis, we investigated
the sensitivity on each Fourier basis function. For com-
parison, we checked the sensitivity on the standard basis
directions, which is the manipulation on each pixel. We also
tested the sensitivity in random directions (see Sec. 5.7). We
first describe the method we used to study the sensitivity.
For Fourier basis, we applied a single Fourier attack (Algo-
rithm. 1) and calculated its fool ratio on a single minibatch
for each frequency. We bounded the size of perturbations
by 30/255 in `∞-norm for MNIST, FMNIST, and SVHN,
20/255 for ILSVRC2015, and 10/255 for CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100. For a standard basis, we added 255/255 to
each pixel and then clipped to range from zero to one for
Algorithm 2: Creation of heatmap
foreach (i,j) in frequencies:
B := Randomly select Minibatch;
y ← Forward(B);
y′ ← Forward(B + noise);
Heatmapi,j ← FoolRatio(y, y′);
Figure 4. Visualization of sensitive spot of convolutional networks
in Fourier domain. Coordinate (i, j) of each image represents
fool ratio on a single minibatch when we used Algorithm 1 as
a perturbation. White areas are spots with high fool ratio. The
center of each image corresponds to a high-frequency area. The
perturbation sizes were 30/255 for MNIST, FMNIST, and SVHN,
and 10/255 for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. The creation of this
heatmap is described in Algorithm. 2.
Figure 5. Visualization of sensitivity in Fourier domain. Visulaiza-
tion procedure is the same with Figure 4. We can see that most
sensitive frequency is neither hight nor low frequencies, and it lies
in the middle. For reference, frequency distributions in natural
images and random noise can be found in Figure 8.
attack creation, which is an analogy of Algorithm 1. Us-
ing heat maps, we visualized the results for Fourier basis
on ILSVRC2015 in Figure 5 and the results on the other
datasets in Figure 4. The algorithm to create the heat map is
described in Algorithm 2.
We observed that in most cases except for MNIST, ar-
chitectures tend to have some sensitive spots in the Fourier
domain. Especially on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, VGG and
Wide-ResNet showed near 90% and 99% fooling ratio to
some directions. The result means that the predictions be-
Figure 6. Visualization of the sensitivity of multilayer perceptrons
(MLPs) in the Fourier domain. MLPs did not have sensitive spot as
CNNs in most cases and they were more resistant to directions of
Fourier basis.
came almost random guess. Since all Fourier basis directions
are orthogonal, Figure 4 highlights that there are hundreds
of directions that networks are sensitive independent of their
inputs. While it has been known that there are tens of or-
thogonal directions for transferable or universal adversarial
examples, to the best of our knowledge, this is the fastest
method to find a large number of orthogonal directions for
which networks are universally vulnerable. Contrastive to
Fourier basis, experiments using standard basis achieved
almost 0% fool ratio in all settings. In this experiment, we
showed the existence of sensitive spots of convolutional net-
works in the Fourier domain and the effectiveness of the
characterization by Fourier basis directions.
5.3. Convolutional networks vs. MLP
In Sec. 5.2 we observed that various convolutional neural
networks are sensitive to some Fourier basis directions. To
see whether the sensitivity to the Fourier basis functions is
caused by network architectures as suggested in Sec. 4 or
the nature of image processing, we compared the sensitivity
of a MLP to Fourier basis functions. We used the same
method as Sec. 5.2 for the comparison. Figure 6 shows the
results for the MLP trained on various datasets. The MLP
did not show the vulnerability to some vectors in the Fourier
basis. The contrastive activation pattern of convolutional
networks and multilayer perceptrons supports our analysis
of the sensitivity in Sec. 4. This result suggests the possibility
that changing architectures is a useful measure to mitigate
adversarial examples, especially UAPs. Since prior defense
work has mostly focused on training methods [7, 21], this
opens another research direction for defense methods. For
example, we may use the information of the weak spots
in the Fourier domain to choose which models to use for
ensembles.
5.4. Co-occurrence of sensitivity
In the evaluation in Secs. 5.2 and 5.3, we observed that
convolutional networks showed similar sensitivity to the
Fourier basis directions with similar frequencies. Since
Sec. 4 does not cover this phenomenon, we explain it here.
In convolutional networks, the convolution kernel size is
typically much smaller than the input size. The size of the
kernel restricts the expressiveness of convolutional layers.
This restriction makes convolutional layers respond simi-
Figure 7. Coordinate (i, j) of each image shows the magnitude of
outputs of a convolutional layer when input was (F32)i ⊗ (F32)j .
The kernel size of each convolutional layer is 3. They were
trained to maximize the output against (F32)8 ⊗ (F32)8, (F32)8 ⊗
(F32)16, (F32)12 ⊗ (F32)12, and(F32)16 ⊗ (F32)16, respectively.
Figure 8. Visualization of UAPs calculated for various archi-
tectures on ILSVRC2012 by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [24] in the
Fourier domain. Coordinate (i, j) corresponds to the fool ratio of
(F224)i ⊗ (F224)j . White spots had higher fool ratio.
larly to similar frequencies. To see the co-occurrence of the
sensitivity, we trained convolutional layers with kernel size
3× 3 and the input size 32× 32 so that the `2-norm of their
outputs are maximized when one specific Fourier basis is
fed as its input. Then we tested the `2-norm of the layer’s
outputs when their inputs are other Fourier basis functions.
Figure 7 shows the result. The result confirms the hypoth-
esis that convolutional layers respond similarly to Fourier
basis directions with similar frequency. In other words, the
optimization problem 1 has a small Lipschitz constant. This
property is known to be favorable for optimizations in many
algorithms including Bayesian optimizations [36].
5.5. UAPs in Fourier domain
In this section, we investigate whether UAPs created
by an existing method also have some specific patterns in
the Fourier domain. For this analysis, we used precom-
puted UAPs for VGG16, VGG19, VGG-F, CaffeNet [14],
ResNet152, and GoogLeNet by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
[24]. Figure 8 shows the magnitude of each frequency of
each UAP in log scale. For reference, Figure 8 also shows
those of random noise and average magnitudes of each fre-
quency of original training data in ILSVRC2015.
While architectures and training procedures differ, Fig-
ure 8 and Figure 5 share a similar tendency compared to
the random noise and original images. For example, we
Figure 9. Visualization of FGSM attack in the Fourier domain in
the same way as in Figure 8. FGSM had larger values in sensitive
spots revealed in Figure 4. Center of each image is a high-frequency
area.
can see from Figure 5 that the networks are relatively ro-
bust against high-frequency noises and sensitive to low and
middle-frequency noises. From Figure 8, current UAPs ap-
pear to exploit the sensitivity. This suggests the effectiveness
to consider Fourier domain to analyze existing UAPs.
5.6. Adversarial attacks in Fourier domain
In this section, we investigate whether current white box
adversarial attacks also have some tendency in the Fourier
domain. We studied FGSM [7], which is known to transfer
better than naive iterative attacks [21]. Figure 9 shows the
average magnitude of each vector in the Fourier basis of
a perturbation created by FGSM on test data. Compared
with Figure 4, which revealed sensitive spots in the Fourier
domain, Figure 9 shows that the mass of FGSM concen-
trates almost in the sensitive spots. This experiment also
shows that adversarial perturbations do not necessarily lie
in a high-frequency area, which denies a common myth that
adversarial perturbations tend to be high-frequency. Figure 9
also shows that the tendency of adversarial perturbations
differs across datasets and architectures, which reminds us
to test defense methods in various settings.
5.7. Effectiveness of Fourier attack
The analysis in Sec. 4 and experiments in Secs. 5.2 – 5.6
suggests the effectiveness of the Fourier basis functions as
universal adversarial perturbations. We evaluated its ability
to flip predictions on various datasets and architectures. We
Table 1. Fool ratio of random noise (upper rows) and SFA (Algo-
rithm 1, lower rows) on various architectures and datasets. Despite
the simpleness of our algorithm, some pairs dropped their accuracy
to almost chance ratio. This results show that our characterization
through Fourier basis functions effectively captures the sensitivity
of networks.
LeNet WResNet VGG DenseNet
MNIST 0.1 55.8 0.0 0.1
Fashion MNIST 5.4 11.4 8.3 12.6
SVHN 3.1 5.2 0.0 4.6
CIFAR10 5.0 8.1 6.8 5.4
CIFAR100 13.0 26.4 25.9 22.5
MNIST 0.4 90.2 0.1 0.2
Fashion MNIST 12.5 48.1 83.7 56.9
SVHN 64.9 90.8 0.0 50.5
CIFAR10 63.3 82.3 72.2 50.7
CIFAR100 83.4 93.7 95.8 72.3
Table 2. Fool ratio of Fourier basis attack on various architec-
tures on ILSVRC2015. Rand is random noise, SSFA is defined in
Sec. 5.7. Attacks are bounded in 10/255 and 20/255 in `∞-norm.
UAP denotes the best performing precomputed UAP in [24] per
architecture. Since naively scaling them to 20/255 can be unfairly
advantageous to ours and we just omitted the evaluation. While
comparable, our algorithm does not assume access to the same
training data and also has no need to train models locally.
GoogLeNet ResNet VGG DenseNet
Rand(10) 8.2 8.5 11.5 9.5
Rand(20) 14.9 16.1 19.7 16.7
UAP(10) [24] 45.5 49.7 64.8 56.0
SFA(10) 34.6 38.7 49.7 36.8
SFA(20) 62.3 68.5 76.3 63.5
SSFA(10) 44.1 40.1 53.3 39.5
SSFA(20) 74.1 66.9 79.0 62.5
set the size of perturbations to 10/255 in `∞ for CIFAR,
and to 30/255 for MNIST, FMNIST, and SVHN. We used
frequencies with the highest fool ratio in Figure 4 as the
perturbations. In the evaluation, we used Algorithm 1 with
one fixed frequency per pair of dataset and architecture. For
comparison, we calculated the fool ratio of random noise
sampled from the -ball bounded in `∞-norm. Table 1 shows
the result. Given the dataset and architecture-agnostic
search space, the attack showed strong attack ability. Es-
pecially in CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 experiments, some
architectures dropped prediction accuracy almost to that of
random guessing. This effectiveness of Fourier basis attack
highlights the sensitivity of current convolutional networks
against Fourier features. In MNIST, however, the fool ratio
was not as high as other datasets. Since MNIST is highly
normalized dataset and easiest among them, we suspect that
networks can better capture true signal from the inputs and
are more robust to change of a single Fourier basis direction.
From the viewpoints of architectures, LeNet and DenseNet
were more robust than others. We explain this by their max-
pooling layers. As max-pooling layers are not supported in
Sec. 4, they add additional nonlinearities and mix Fourier
basis.
We also tested Algorithm 1 on ILSVRC2015. For the
evaluation, we fixed one frequency for all architectures and
inputs2. In other words, we selected a single perturbation
input and architecture agnostically. To choose the frequency,
we took the average of Figure 5 and picked the frequency
with the highest fool ratio. Figure 1 shows examples of
created adversarial examples. We used 10/255 and 20/255
for the size of perturbations. Note that previous work used
10/255 for the evaluation [24]. Examples of created UAPs
are shown in Figure 1. We empirically found that taking the
sign of Fourier basis can sometimes boost the performance
of the attack. We named this attack Signed-SFA (SSFA), and
we also tested the attack. In the evaluation, we also tested
random perturbations and the best precomputed UAP from
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [24] per architecture. The result
is shown in Table 2. Compared to Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
[24], the fool ratio is comparable to their perturbations under
this black-box setting. Note, since our algorithm does not
need to train local model, our algorithm is more suitable in
black-box settings.
6. Conclusion
From the analysis of linearized convolutional neural net-
works, we hypothesized that convolutional networks are sen-
sitive to the directions of Fourier basis functions. Through
empirical evaluations, we validated the sensitivity. The find-
ing provides a better characterization of universal adversarial
perturbations using Fourier basis functions. The character-
ization might be beneficial to the development of defense
methods and the analysis of statistical generalization guar-
antees. As a by-product of our analysis, we proposed a
black-box method to create universal adversarial perturba-
tions. The algorithm does not require locally trained models
for black-box attack and extends the potential use cases of
universal adversarial perturbations.
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Table 3. Notation table.
Circ(c): A Circulant matrix crated by a vector c.
xi: An i-th element of a vector x.
Ai,j : An i-th row j-th column element of a matrix A.
Ai,j : An i-th row j-th column element of a matrix A.
ωN : n-th root of 1, exp(2pi
√−1/N).
ωiN : n-th root of 1 power i.
FN : A matrix which (FN )i,j = ω
(i+j)
N .
S(X): 2d Fourier transformation of a matrix X .
QN : A matrix FN ⊗ FN .
⊗: A Kronecker product.
Im: m-dimensional identity matrix.
R: Im ⊗QN .
m: Channel size.
A. Notations
Notations are summarized in table 3.
B. Preliminary
B.1. Circulant matrix
Let c be a vector and ci be the i-th element of the vector c. A circulant matrix is a matrix with the following shape.
Circ(c:) =

c0 c1 . . . cn−2 cn−1
cn−1 c0 c1 cn−2
... cn−1 c0
. . .
...
c2
. . . . . . c1
c1 c2 . . . cn−1 c0
. (5)
A doubly block circulant matrix is a block matrix whose blocks are circulant. The matrix A below is an example of a doubly
block circulant matrix.
A =

Circ(K0,:) Circ(K1,:) . . . Circ(Kn−2,:) Circ(Kn−1,:)
Circ(Kn−1,:) Circ(K0,:) Circ(K1,:) Circ(Kn−2,:)
... Circ(Kn−1,:) Circ(K0,:)
. . .
...
Circ(K2,:)
. . . . . . Circ(K1,:)
Circ(K1,:) Circ(K2,:) . . . Circ(Kn−1,:) Circ(K0,:)
, (6)
where Ki,: is a i-th row of a matrix K. When the channel size of a convolutional layer is equal to one and padding is “wraps
around,” convolution operation can be written as a doubly block circulant matrix [6, 33].
C. Proof of propositions
C.1. Proposition 1
We prove the proposition following Sedghi et al. [33]. Our assumption is that the padding is “wrap around”. Under the
assumption, a convolutional can be represented by the following matrix M .
M =

B(0,0) B(0,1) . . . B(0,min−1)
B(1,0) B(1,1) . . . B(1,min−1)
...
...
. . .
...
B(mout−1,0) B(mout−1,1) . . . B(mout−1,min−1)
, (7)
where each B(c,d) is a doubly circulant matrix. Let D(c,d) = QHNB
(c,d)QN . Since Bc,d is a doubly circulant matrix, D(c,d) is
a diagonal matrix. Now we can write,
(Iout ⊗QN )HM (Iin ⊗QN ) =

D(0,0) D(0,1) . . . D(0,min−1)
D(1,0) D(1,1) . . . D(1,min−1)
...
...
. . .
...
D(mout−1,0) D(mout−1,1) . . . D(mout−1,min−1)
. (8)
By multiplying (Imout ⊗QN ) from left and (Imin ⊗QN )H from right, we have
M = (Imout ⊗QN )L (Imin ⊗QN )H, (9)
where
L =

D(0,0) D(0,1) . . . D(0,min−1)
D(1,0) D(1,1) . . . D(1,min−1)
...
...
. . .
...
D(mout−1,0) D(mout−1,1) . . . D(mout−1,min−1)
. (10)
C.2. Proposition 2
We prove the proposition partially following Sedghi et al. [33]. Using prop. 1, M (i) can be decomposed as follows.
M (i) =
(
Imi+1 ⊗QN
)
L(i) (Imi ⊗QN )H, (11)
where L(i) is a block matrix such that each block is diagonal. Since
(Im ⊗QN )H (Im ⊗QN ) = ImN2 , (12)
we can write M as
M =
(
Imd+1 ⊗QN
)( d∏
i=1
L(i)
)
(Im1 ⊗QN )H, (13)
where d is the number of layers. Let
L =
d∏
i=1
L(i) (14)
=

D(0,0) D(0,1) . . . D(0,min−1)
D(1,0) D(1,1) . . . D(1,min−1)
...
...
. . .
...
D(mout−1,0) D(mout−1,1) . . . D(mout−1,min−1)
. (15)
Since all L(i) are block matrix such that all blocks are diagonal, D(i,j) are diagonal. For any w ∈ {1, . . . , N2}, let G(w) be a
matrix such that
G
(w)
i,j = D
(i,j)
w,w . (16)
Let σ be a singular value of G(w) with a left singular vector x and a right singular vector y. We claim that y ⊗ (QN ):,w is a
right singular vector of M . Let ew be a standard basis vector. Since D(i,j) is diagonal,
L(y ⊗ ew) = σ(x⊗ ew). (17)
Thus,
M (y ⊗ (QN ):,w) = (Imd+1 ⊗QN )L(y ⊗ ew) (18)
= σ(Imd+1 ⊗QN )(x⊗ ew) (19)
= σ(x⊗ (QN ):,w). (20)
Let σ˜ be another singular value of G(w) with a left singular vector x˜ and a right singular vector y˜. Then,
(x⊗ ((QN ):,w))H(x˜⊗ ((QN ):,w)) = (x⊗ ((QN ):,w))H(Imout ⊗QN )(Imout ⊗QN )H(x˜⊗ ((QN ):,w)) (21)
= (x⊗ ew)H(x˜⊗ ew) (22)
= xHx˜ (23)
= 0. (24)
Similarly,
(y ⊗ ((QN ):,w))H(y˜ ⊗ ((QN ):,w)) = 0. (25)
Also,
(x⊗ ((QN ):,w))H(x⊗ ((QN ):,w)) = 1, (26)
(y ⊗ ((QN ):,w))H(y ⊗ ((QN ):,w)) = 1. (27)
Let σ˜ be another singular value of G(w˜) with a left singular vector x˜ and a right singular vector y˜, where w 6= w˜. Then,
(x⊗ ((QN ):,w))H(x˜⊗ ((QN ):,w˜)) = (x⊗ ((QN ):,w))H(Imout ⊗QN )(Imout ⊗QN )H(x˜⊗ ((QN ):,w˜)) (28)
= (x⊗ ew)H(x˜⊗ ew˜) (29)
= 0. (30)
The last line holds because there are no overwrap in non-zero elements in the two vectors. Similarly,
(y ⊗ ((QN ):,w))H(y˜ ⊗ ((QN ):,w˜)) = 0. (31)
Thus, using the Kronecker product of singular vectors of G(w) and (QN ):,w for all w, we may form a singular value
decomposition of M .
C.3. Proposition 3
Let M be a matrix that represents the convolutional layer. When we have a skip connection, the convolution plus the skip
connection can be represented as
M + I. (32)
Since M is a doubly block circulant matrix, M + I is also a doubly block circulant matrix. Thus, we can apply Prop. 2 with
the number of layer d = 1.
C.4. Proposition 4
Normalization layers such as batch-normalization layer at test time or weight-normalization layer can be represented by a
multiplication of a diagonal matrix whose elements corresponding to the same channels are equal. Thus, convolutional layers
followed by such normalization layers can be represented by Eq. (7). Thus, we can apply Prop. 2.
C.5. Proposition 5
First, we consider a sampling operation to a tensor G such that we sample elements of inputs whose x, y coordinates are in
{i, j|i = 0 (mod s) and j = 0 (mod s)}. For simplicity, we consider a convolution with intput output channel sizes are one.
We start from analysis of the output of the operation when its input is (FN ):,a ⊗ (FN )b,:. Since i, j-th element of the output is
((FN ):,a ⊗ (FN )b,:)i×s,j×s and
((FN ):,a ⊗ (FN )b,:)i×s,j×s =
(
(FN/s):,(a%(N/s)) ⊗ (FN/s)(b%(N/s)),:
)
i,j
, (33)
the output is (FN/s):,(a%(N/s)) ⊗ (FN/s)(b%(N/s)),:. Thus, when we decompose the input x as
x =
N∑
a=0
N∑
b=0
λ(a,b)(FN ):,a ⊗ (FN )b,:, (34)
and decompose the output y as
y =
N/s∑
a=0
N/s∑
b=0
λ˜(a,b)(FN ):,a ⊗ (FN )b,:, (35)
the following equation holds.
λ˜(a,b) =
s∑
l=0
s∑
r=0
λ(a+lN/s,b+rN/s). (36)
Let M = (Imin ⊗Q)L(Imin ⊗Q)H be a matrix that represents a convolutional layer with stride 1. Since a convolutional
layer with stride s can be represented by a multiplication of M followed by the sampling operation, it can be represented by
SM . Now, we consider the singular value decomposition of SM . Let Λw be a set of indices defined as follows.
Λw = {w + lN2/s+ rN/s|l, r ∈ {1, . . . , s}}. (37)
For any frequency i and index j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let σ(i,j) be a singular value of M with a left singular vector x(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
and a right singular vector y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i. For any frequency w, {p(i,j)|w ∈ Λw, j ∈ {1, . . . ,min}, pi,j ∈ C}, we have
SM
 ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,min}
p(i,j)y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
 (38)
=S
 ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,mout}
σ(i,j)p(i,j)x(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
 (39)
=
 ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,mout}
σ(i,j)p(i,j)x(i,j)
⊗ (QN/s):,w. (40)
Let X be a mout ×mins2 matrix such that each column is σ(i,j)x(i,j) and X = UΣV H be a singular value decomposition of
X . We claim that when we use a column of V as p,∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,min}
p(i,j)y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i (41)
is a right singular vector of SM .
Choose p such that Xp 6= 0. Let Up be a column of U corresponding to p, which is a colum of V . Let Σp be a diagonal
element of Σ corresponding to p. We have
SM
 ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,min}
p(i,j)y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
 (42)
=
 ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,mout}
σ(i,j)p(i,j)x(i,j)
⊗ (QN/s):,w (43)
=ΣpUp ⊗ (QN/s):,w. (44)
For any p, since all y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i are linearly independent, we have ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,m}
p(i,j)y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
H  ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,m}
p(i,j)y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
 (45)
=
∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,m}
‖p(i,j)‖2 (46)
=1. (47)
Also, when p˜ is a different column of V , ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,m}
p(i,j)y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
H  ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,m}
p˜(i,j)y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
 (48)
=
∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,m}
(p(i,j))∗p˜(i,j) (49)
=0. (50)
Let w˜ 6= w be a different frequency and ∑
i∈Λw˜,j∈{1,...,m}
p˜(i,j)y˜(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i (51)
be a vector constructed with the same way as (41) for w˜. Since all vectors in the union of {y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i|i ∈ Λw, j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}} and {y˜(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i|i ∈ Λw˜, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} are linearly independent, ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,m}
p(i,j)y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
H  ∑
i∈Λw˜,j∈{1,...,m}
p˜(i,j)y˜(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i
 = 0. (52)
Since U is unitary, for any column Up,
(Up ⊗ (QN/s):,w)H(Up ⊗ (QN/s):,w) = 1, (53)
and
(Up ⊗ (QN/s):,w)H(Up˜ ⊗ (QN/s):,w) = 0 (54)
when p˜ 6= p. Let w˜ 6= w be a different frequency. Since (QN/s):,w and (QN/s):,w˜ are linearly independent,
(Up ⊗ (QN/s):,w)H(U˜p˜ ⊗ (QN/s):,w˜) = 0. (55)
Thus, for any frequency w, Σp is a singular value of SM with a left singular vector Up ⊗ (QN/s):,w and a right singular
vector ∑
i∈Λw,j∈{1,...,m}
p(i,j)y(i,j) ⊗ (QN ):,i. (56)
We may form a singular value decomposition of SM by using them.
C.6. Proposition 6
Assume x is a vector such that S(x)u,v = S(x)∗N−u,N−v . Let y = S(x). Then,
xu,v = S
−1(y)u,v (57)
=
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
ym,n exp(2pi
√−1(um+ vn)/N) (58)
=
1
2N
N−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
(
ym,n exp(2pi
√−1(um+ vn)/N) + yN−m,N−n exp(2pi
√−1(u(N −m) + v(N − n))/N)) (59)
=
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
(Re(ym,n) cos(2pi(um+ vn)/N)− Im(ym,n) sin(2pi(um+ vn)/N)) , (60)
which is real. Thus, when S(x)u,v = S(x)∗N−u,N−v for all u and v, x is real.
Assume x is a real vector. Then,
S(x)∗N−u,N−v =
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
ym,n exp(2pi
√−1((N − u)m+ (N − v)n)/N)∗ (61)
=
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
ym,n exp(−2pi
√−1((N − u)m+ (N − v)n)/N) (62)
=
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
ym,n exp(2pi
√−1(um+ vn)/N) (63)
= S(x)u,v. (64)
D. Evaluation setups
Datasets: We used MNIST [23], fashion-MNIST [44], SVHN [28], CIFAR10, CIFAR100 [19], and ILSVRC2015 [32] as
datasets. For CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, as an data augmentation, we padded four pixels on each side and randomly sampled a
32× 32 crop from the padded image or its horizontal flip. 4 pixels are padded on each side We then normalized them with the
mean and std of each channel. For training on ILSVRC2015, we augmented data following He et al. [10]. For training on
ILSVRC2015, we rescaled images with its shorter side randomly sampled in [256, 480] and randomly cropped into 224× 244
for scale augmentation [34]. We used per-channel subtraction and standard color augmentation [20]. For other datasets, we
scaled inputs into the range from zero to one.
Architectures: We used a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) consisting of 1000–1000 hidden layer with ReLU activation,
LeNet [22], WideResNet [45], DenseNet-BC [12], and VGG [34] with batch-normalization for evaluations on datasets except
for ILSVRC2015. For ILSVRC2015, we used ResNet50 [10], DenseNet, VGG16, and GoogLeNet [37]. For VGG16 and
GoogLeNet, we added a batch-normalization layer after each convolution for faster training.
Training details except for ILSVRC2015: We used Nesterov momentum as an optimizer with momentum 0.9, weight
decay 0.0005, and batchsize 128 for the experiments. We trained the MLP and LeNet for 50 epochs with an initial learning rate
0.1 decayed by 0.1 at every 10 epochs. We trained WideResNet as follows. For MNIST, fashion-MNIST, and SVHN, we used
width factor k = 4, layer 16, and dropout ratio 0.4, and trained for 160 epochs with initial learning ratio 0.01 decayed by 0.1
at epoch 80 and 120. For CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, we used width factor k = 10, layer 28, and dropout ratio 0.3, and trained
for 200 epochs with initial learning ratio 0.1 decayed by 0.1 at epoch 60, 120, and 160. These are the same configuration for
SVHN and CIFAR in Zagoruyko and Komodakis [45]. We trained DenseNet-BC with layer 100, growth rate 12, and dropout
ratio 0.2.
Training details on ILSVRC2015: We used SGD with momentum 0.9, weight decay 0.0001, and batchsize 256, and
trained for 90 epochs for all architectures. For ResNet50, GoogLeNet, and VGG16, we used the same learning rate scheduling
and momentum correction used by Goyal et al. [8]. For DenseNet121, we set an initial learning rate to 0.1 and multiplied by
0.1 at epoch 30 and 60, following Huang et al. [12].
Metric: We used the fool ratio as a metric, which is the percentage of data that models changed its prediction, following
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [24].
